Yes, but containing US protectionism will also be crucial
Autumn 2008
The EU’s importance in the combat against climate change can’t be overstated. But as Bernice Lee and Nick Mabey point out, it is now up to the EU to justify its claim to leadership and show that the transition to a low carbon economy is possible. Despite modest falls in emissions in some EU countries, the record so far is not good – particularly when international emissions from trade and transport are included.
Lee and Mabey set out convincingly the EU and China’s shared challenges, and identify important ways forward that would be based on co-operation rather than competition. Long overdue, co-operation is nevertheless vital if we are to achieve a global deal to combat climate change. Developing countries such as China have been promised resources to help square their economic development needs with the impact of climate change measures.
Although the EU and China are important, the United States as the world’s largest developed country is also crucial. The US will soon be returning to the international negotiating table in a serious manner; both presidential candidates have track records in supporting domestic action to reduce carbon emissions. But there is also a protectionist mood in Congress. The idea of American energy independence is once again gaining momentum, despite its serious flaws. The United States should not be allowed to use China as an excuse to avoid its own responsibility for climate change, but protectionism is likely to be a feature of US policy. It will be up to the EU to resist the temptation to follow suit.
Many Europeans will be surprised to learn that Europe will build as many power plants as China over the next 25 years. Despite EU countries’ targets for the deployment of renewables, long lead-times and patchy support for nuclear energy mean that many of the new plants will be burning fossil fuels. Europe’s progress with carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies will be of critical importance, because if they work these technologies could be a vital feature of many low carbon pathways. The EU must therefore match the plans announced for CCS demonstrations with the finance needed to make them happen. And additional finance is also needed to make the EU-China project that is currently on the drawing board a reality.
The success of a new global climate agreement in Copenhagen will be measured its ability to shift investment to the low carbon economy. Private sector innovation, underpinned by finance and policy incentives from governments, will help deliver the scale of change needed to avoid a 2°C rise in global temperatures. Trust and not suspicion will be required to achieve this in our interdependent world. Low-carbon economic zones (LCEZs) can help build that trust, but LCEZs also need the political will to create demand for low carbon technologies, to remove associated trade barriers and to combine technology development with low-cost manufacturing.
This is a concept that should not be limited to China alone. Many low carbon technologies will be more cost competitive in the EU, where fossil energy prices are higher. A global effort based on initiatives like LCEZs is needed to ensure that success is not measured on the basis of a few national experiments; the EU and other industrialised countries need to show that low carbon societies can be achieved at home too.
As Lee and Mabey rightly conclude, the low carbon transition does not only imply costs, but also benefits. These include avoiding the costs of severe climate change, improvements in energy security, the creation of new jobs and new export earnings. The EU must maintain its leadership in negotiating a post 2012 deal, including working with a re-engaged United States. Developing countries like China will not join in the endeavour until they are treated fairly by developed countries and are thus able to share the benefits of a low carbon future.